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Abstract
Transactive energy systems (TES) are emerging as a transformative
solution for the problems faced by distribution system operators due
to an increase in the use of distributed energy resources and a rapid
acceleration in renewable energy generation. These, on one hand,
pose a decentralized power system controls problem, requiring
strategic microgrid control to maintain stability for the community
and for the utility. On the other hand, they require robust financial
markets operating on distributed software platforms that preserve
privacy. In this paper, we describe the implementation of a novel,
blockchain-based transactive energy system. We outline the key
requirements and motivation of this platform, describe the lessons
learned, and provide a description of key architectural components
of this system.
Keywords Transactive energy platforms, blockchain, privacy, se-
curity, safety, smart contracts
1 Introduction
EmergingTrends:Transactive energy systems (TES) have emerged
as an anticipated outcome of the shift in electricity industry, away
from centralized, monolithic business models characterized by bulk
generation and one-way delivery, toward a decentralized model in
which end users play a more active role in both production and con-
sumption [10] [24]. In this paper, we consider a class of TES that op-
erates in grid-connected mode. The main actors are the consumers,
which are comprised primarily of residential loads and prosumers
who operate distributed energy resources (DERs), such as rooftop,
solar batteries or flexible loads capable of demand/response. Ad-
ditionally, a distribution system operator (DSO) manages the grid
connection of the network. Such installations are equipped with an
advanced metering infrastructure consisting of TE-enabled smart
meters. In addition to the standard functionalities of smart meters:
i.e. the ability to measure line voltages, power consumption and
production, and communicate these to the distribution system oper-
ator (DSO); TE-enabled smart meters are capable of communicating
with other smart meters, have substantial on-board computational
resources, and are capable of accessing the Internet and cloud com-
puting services as needed. Examples of such installations include
the well-known Brooklyn Microgrid Project, [3] and the Sterling
Ranch learning community (currently under development) [12].
A key component of TES is a transaction management platform
(TMP), which handles all market clearing functions in a way that
balances supply and demand in the local market.
Why Blockchains?: The capabilities of TE-enabled meters al-
low them to form a blockchain (BC) based TMP executing a market
mechanism, using smart contracts [29]. Examples of BC systems
capable of executing smart contracts include Ethereum [7] and
Hyperledger Fabric [9]. There are a number of appealing properties
of BC systems that motivate their use in a TMP. Firstly, BC tech-
nology enables the digital representation of energy and financial
assets, and their secure transfer from one set of parties to another.
By design, the security of this value transfer is guaranteed by the
interaction protocol itself and obviates the need for trusted trans-
action intermediaries. Secondly, the execution of smart contracts
(i.e. code that captures the market logic and participant roles) is
automated and guaranteed. Thirdly, the blockchain constitutes an
immutable, complete, and fully auditable record of all transactions
that have ever occurred in the BC system. These properties ensure
market transparency, as well as the availability of a detailed market
load profile, and grid utilization data. Thus, [1, 4, 27] have already
considered such implementations.
Open challenges: Existing initiatives such as [1, 4, 27] do not
consider the impact of the electricity market on the controller
responsible for the stability of the system due to the expectation that
the bulk grid will maintain system stability. Furthermore, although
these solutions present interesting case studies, they provide only
a subset of services, which do not affect the overall power flow on
the grid in a significant way. For example, they do not address the
security, stability, and privacy requirements, which we describe in
the next section. The information technology backbone that allows
energy trades in an open P2P market to take place anonymously,
and securely, has yet to be developed [23, 28].
Contributions→ Design and Implementation of Privacy-
preserving Energy Transactions (PETra)We focus on the spec-
ification of the components of the platform, their interfaces, and
the distributed ledger in the system. Additionally, we highlight the
architectural and protocol specifications of our platform, which
ensure privacy and security for participants in the TES, as well as
safety for the TES. The specific contributions of this paper are (a)
proposal of a set of TES requirements extracted from our experi-
ence, (b) architectural and protocol specification and implemen-
tation of a new blockchain-based middleware called PETra, first
introduced in [20], and (c) an empirical demonstration of the PETra
functionality using an actual load profile data set from a microgrid
test installation in Germany. In particular, the high volumes of mi-
crotransactions in the envisioned TES pose challenges related to
real-time communication of sensor data; for example, request-reply
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messaging between TMP modules, and other signaling that occurs
outside of the blockchain. We will refer to these as “out of band
communications.”
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the
requirements for this class of distributed systems. Section 3 de-
scribes the state of the art. We present our solution in section 4. It
is followed by an evaluation and discussion in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.
2 Requirement Analysis
The trading scenarios we consider involve consumers and pro-
sumers that participate in a local P2P energy trading market by
posting offers to sell produced energy, or offers to buy and con-
sume energy in each consecutive time interval. An offer consists
of quantity of energy being bought or sold, the time interval in
which the trade is to be made, and possibly a reservation price -
the maximum (or respectively, minimum) price at which the buyer
(or respectively, seller) is willing to trade. The DSO bargains on the
bulk market and provides all residual supply and demand within
the microgrid.
We assume that each participant has a means of predicting her
future power production and consumption based on historical data,
and does so prior to trading on the market. An example of a home
energy management system that provides this means is the Siemens
Energy IP Analytics Suite. Moreover, each participant is represented
by an automated trading agent that strategically posts offers to the
TMP based on these predictions and the participant’s personal
trading goals.
In the simplest trading scenario, the DSO sets the price p per
kWH for the local market; p is the price paid by any buyer and
received by any seller, including the DSO. The DSO can then dynam-
ically adjust the price p to affect the market efficiency, evaluated
as the number of local transactions vs. energy demand being met
from a bulk supplier. Another scenario includes a fully dynamic
market where all sellers, including the DSO, post offers that include
a reservation price. Each consumer then picks a selling offer on a
first-come, first-served basis. An extension of this scenario involves
double auctions where both selling and buying offers are posted
to the TMP, which executes an automated, regulator-approved
market clearing algorithm as an immutable smart contract on the
TMP’s blockchain system. This algorithm selects the clearing price
p within each time interval. With respect to these trading scenarios
we propose the following requirements.
Communication Fabric The first requirement is the existence
of an appropriate communication and messaging architecture. The
TMP must collect participants’ offers and make them available
to buyers, and the market algorithm must communicate clearing
prices, buyer-seller matchings, or other market-related signals de-
pending on the trading scenario. In order to meet the operational
and safety requirements described next, these messages must be
reliably delivered under strict timing constraints, derived from the
deadline by which a trade must clear. Moreover, the TMP must be
capable of handling high volumes of micro-transactions anticipated
in P2P trading scenarios. Finally, the communication fabric must
support confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation of transac-
tional data.
Operational Safety and Cyber-Physical Security The trad-
ing activity permitted by the TMP shall not compromise the stability
of the physical system operation. Moreover, congestion constraints
along any feeder shall be respected.1 This also requires assurance
that malicious or negligent trading activity is discouraged. 2 Fi-
nally, the TMP should have provisions for preventing or detecting
negligent or malicious interference with smart meters - i.e. the
adversarial or natural attacks against the interface between the
physical world and the blockchain; data logged shall be securely
communicated to the DSO and requests made by themeter on behalf
of the prosumer shall be accurately recorded on the blockchain.
Market Security The TMP shall include provisions for ensuring
the protection of consumer interests, as well as those of the DSO.
Consumer interests include being billed correctly and fairly based
on energy prices set by the DSO and the measurements made by the
smart meters. Additionally, it is important to ensure all prosumers
will be allowed to participate in the market fairly.
Privacy Information such as the amount of energy produced,
consumed, bought, or sold by any prosumer should be available only
to the DSO and the essential market functions of the TMP. All bids
and asks, and the matching thereof, should remain anonymous. A
participant’s energy usage patterns and personal information, such
as financial standing, shall not be inferable from the participant’s
trading activity3.
3 Analysis of State of the Art
The TMP system requires peer-to-peer messaging, enabling each
stakeholder to receive all the required ‘bid’ messages, concerning a
specific ask. Thereafter, a consumer can choose to accept a bid and
inform the ledger about the acceptance. Once the bid is accepted,
the transaction is recorded into a distributed ledger in a way that
allows everyone in the community to agree that the transaction
took place. Once consensus is established, the transaction is deemed
successful, and we say that the market has cleared. In the context
of this workflow, we next describe the state of the art across the
two dimensions of Application and Communication platforms in
smart grid and distributed transaction management platform for
smart grid.
Application Platforms for Smart Grid There seem to be two
approaches in general for moving power applications from cen-
tralized to distributed processing paradigms. One approach is to
consider each remote computing entity (or node) as an agent [33] or
actor [5] [21] that communicates via messages with other agents or
actors, and focuses on specific grid issues such as state estimation,
remedial action schemes, and load shedding. The other approach
utilizes each remote computing entity as an open application plat-
form that can host multiple applications managing varied aspects of
the local grid [2]. Both approaches utilize messaging between nodes,
and leverage a common set of services on each node, to handle dis-
tributed coordination concerns. [21] calls for group membership,
leader election, voting, group consensus or agreement on data val-
ues, mutual exclusion on access to shared resources, and multicast
communication with same order and atomic properties. Both [33]
1In the context of grid-connected microgrids, system stability refers to real-time
balancing – i.e. the system’s ability to dynamically match supply and demand as
closely as possible, and a tendency to drive the difference between supply and demand
to zero under small perturbations. Resiliency refers to the system’s ability to react to
contingencies and recover from faults. Congestion on a transmission line occurs when
the power flow exceeds the line’s maximum rated capacity.
2Negligent trading may include producers who commit to a certain production level
and fail to deliver. Transactional security means that the execution of contractual
obligations among all participants, including the DSO, is guaranteed.
3Inference of energy usage patterns can be exploited by inferring the presence or
absence of a person in their home, for example.
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and [21] prototype their approaches using MATLAB toolkits, with
[21] utilizing the Akka Java toolkit to model actors. [25] developed
simulations using the SimPowerSystem software in the Simulink
environment. Our application platform, called Resilient Information
Architecture Platform for Smart Grid (RIAPS) [16], provides actor
and component based abstraction, as well as support for deploying
algorithms on devices across the network4 and solves problems col-
laboratively by providing micro-second level time synchronization
[32], failure based reconfiguration [13], and group creation and
coordination services (still under active development), in addition
to the services described in [21]. It is capable of handling different
communication and running implemented algorithms in real-time.
TransactionManagement Platforms (TMP) for Smart grid
TMP require communication, as well as trading mechanisms that
provide the capability to match the bids and asks. Additionally,
they must provide fairness and integrity assurances. Blockchain
based solutions have the potential to enable large-scale energy
trading based on distributed consensus systems. However, popular
blockchain solutions, such as Bitcoin [26] and Ethereum [8] suffer
from design limitations that prevent their direct application to vali-
dating energy trades. In particular, their transaction-confirmation
time is relatively slow and variable, primarily due to the proof-
of-work algorithm and most of the communication occurring via
the ledger. For example, Aitzhan and Svetinovic implemented a
proof-of-concept platform for decentralized smart grid energy trad-
ing using blockchains, but their system is based on proof-of-work
consensus, and they do not consider grid control and stability, or
scalability [6]. Additionally, there is the problem of privacy - all
transactions in these systems are public [19].
Most works in this area have focused on the privacy issue from
the context of smart meters. McDaniel and McLaughlin discuss
the privacy concerns of energy usage profiling, which smart grids
could potentially enable [22]. Efthymiou and Kalogridis describe a
method for securely anonymizing frequent electrical metering data
sent by a smart meter [14] by using a third party escrow mecha-
nism. Tan et al. study privacy in a smart metering system from an
information theoretic perspective in the presence of energy har-
vesting and storage units [30]. They show that energy harvesting
provides increased privacy by diversifying the energy source, while
a storage device can be used to increase both energy efficiency and
privacy. However, the transaction data provides more fine-grained
information than the smart meter usage patterns [18].
PETra extends these works by (1) leveraging a decentralized
computation fabric provided by smart homes in the community,
(2) addressing the privacy threat posed by trading using a novel
trading sequence implementation, (3) showing how partial trades
can be fulfilled, and (4) using off-blockchain communication primi-
tives provided by the distributed application management platform
RIAPS. While the conceptual design of PETra was presented in [20],
this paper describes the revised protocol and the trading algorithm,
and presents the implementation results.
4 Our Solution - PETra
Our system contains the following types of components (see Fig-
ure 1 for an illustration):
• DSO: There is a single component of this type, which represents
the Distribution System Operator of the microgrid. The primary
4RIAPS uses ZeroMQ [17], and Cap’n Proto [31], to manage the communication layer.
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Figure 1. Components of PETra. The DSO and prosumers are
comprised of RIAPS components and geth Ethereum clients. The
smart contract is implemented in Solidity, a high-level language for
Ethereum, and it is executed by a network of geth miners.
responsibilities of this component are ensuring the safe operation
of the microgrid and regulating the total load of the microgrid. To
this end, the DSO component can limit the energy and financial
assets that the prosumers’ withdraw for trading, and it can also
set a price policy for the microgrid. Note that this component
does not have to be online during trading, so the reliability of
the system does not hinge on the reliability of this component.
• Prosumer: There is a component of this type for every household.
The prosumer components are responsible for trading energy
production and consumption for their households. To do so, a
component first estimates the future production and consump-
tion of the household, withdraws energy production or consump-
tion assets from the DSO, and then trades these assets with other
prosumers. To ensure that trading does not compromise the
household’s privacy, the component uses randomly generated
anonymous addresses for trading, which hide the identities of
trade partners from each other.
• Smart contract: This component (deployed as an Ethereum con-
tract on the private blockchain) is responsible for keeping track
of the energy and financial assets belonging to each anonymous
address, enabling prosumers to post trade offers, and exchang-
ing assets when another prosumer decides to take an offer. The
contract is executed in a decentralized manner by a network of
miners, which provides reliability. Additionally, we have several
Ethereum clients, one per prosumer and one for the DSO, which
interact with the smart contract.
4.1 Assets and Data Structures
The ability to specify points or intervals in time is crucial. For exam-
ple, control signals specify how the microgrid load should change
at certain points in time, energy trades specify when energy will be
consumed or produced, etc. To facilitate representing signals and
transactions, we divide time into fixed-length intervals, and specify
points or periods in time using these discrete timesteps. The length
of the time interval is determined based on the timing assumptions
of the physical power system. For example, the time interval may as
low as 4 seconds, which corresponds to how frequently the control
signal of the DSO typically changes [11].
Prosumers trade energy production and consumption with each
other, which are represented in PETra by energy assets, which is a
structure that comprises the following fields: (a) int64 power: non-
negative amount of power to be produced or consumed (for example,
measured in watts), (b) uint64 start: first time interval in which
energy is to be produced (or consumed), and (c) uint64 end: last
time interval in which energy is to be produced (or consumed).
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withdrawAssets(anonAddress, assets)
failedWithdrawal(anonAddress, msg)
addEnergyAsset(anonAddress, asset), addFinancialBalance(anonAddress, amount)
AssetAdded(anonAddress, assetID, asset)
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Figure 2. Sequence diagram of the trading workflow. Solid lines represent RIAPS messages and Ethereum transactions, while dashed lines
represent smart-contract events. Messages and transaction in red stop the trading workflow.
An asset with positive power value represents energy production,
and we call it an EnergyProductionAsset. An asset with negative
power value, on the other hand, represents energy consumption,
and we call it an EnergyConsumptionAsset.
Energy trading must also involve the transfer of currencies,
which are represented by financial assets. A FinancialAsset is
simply an uint64 value, denominated in a fiat currency.
4.2 Trading Workflow
Next, we discuss the trading workflow that is used by prosumers
to trade energy production and consumption assets, as well as
financial assets with each other. This workflow involves both off-
blockchain messaging (using RIAPS), and on-blockchain transac-
tions and events. We list these messages, transactions, and events in
the order in which they typically appear in the workflow. Figure 2
shows a graphical illustration of the workflow.
• withdrawAssets(anonAddress, assets): RIAPSmessage sent
by a prosumer to the DSO, asking the DSO to transfer energy
and/or financial assets from the prosumer’s account at the DSO
to an anonymous address to protect her privacy. Before send-
ing this message, the prosumer should generate a new random
anonymous address. The message specifies the assets that the
prosumer wishes to withdraw, and the anonymous address to
which the DSO should transfer them, which must be crypto-
graphically signed by the prosumer. Note that the prosumer may
send this message long before actually engaging in trading, so
the DSO does not have to be online continuously.
• failedWithdrawal(anonAddress, msg): RIAPS message sent
by the DSO to the prosumer, notifying the prosumer that the
requested assets cannot be withdrawn due to, e.g., energy safety
requirements or insufficient funds.
• addEnergyAsset(anonAddress, asset),
addFinancialBalance(anonAddress, amount): smart contract
transaction called by the DSO, creating energy and financial as-
sets on the blockchain and transferring them to an anonymous
address. Before recording this transaction, the DSO must first
verify whether enabling the prosumer to trade these assets would
violate any safety requirements. The transaction specifies the
assets and the anonymous address to which they are transferred,
and it must be cryptographically signed by the DSO.
• AssetAdded(anonAddress, assetID, asset),
FinancialAdded(anonAddress, amount): events broadcast by
the smart contract, notifying the prosumer that the requested
assets have been transferred to the anonymous address.
• postOffer(assetID, price): smart contract transaction called
by a prosumer, publicly posting an energy bid or ask. If the
prosumer is interested in buying energy, then it posts an energy
bid, which specifies an energy consumption asset and a price. If
the prosumer is interested in selling, then it posts an energy ask,
which specifies an energy production asset and a price. vIn both
cases, the transaction must be cryptographically signed by the
private key of the address, and it locks the assets until the offer
is accepted or rescinded.
• OfferPosted(offerID, assetID, price): event broadcast by
the smart contract, notifying prosumers that an offer was posted.
• rescindOffer(offerID): smart contract transaction called by
a prosumer, rescinding an offer. The transaction must be crypto-
graphically signed by the private key of the poster.
• acceptOffer(offerID, assetID): smart contract transaction
called by a prosumer, accepting a previously posted offer. If the
offer was an energy bid, then the other prosumer has to provide
an energy production assets; if the offer was an energy ask, then
the other prosumer has to provide both energy consumption and
financial assets. In both cases, the transaction must be crypto-
graphically signed by the private key of the other prosumer’s
anonymous address. If there is an overlap between the time in-
tervals of the offered asset, and the asset provided by the other
prosumer, then the intersecting parts of the assets are exchanged
and the non-overlapping parts are returned to their original own-
ers. Similarly, based on the price and exchanged energy assets, a
part of the financial asset is transferred to the seller, while the
rest is returned to the seller.
• OfferAccepted(offerID, assetID): event broadcast by the
smart contract, notifying the prosumer that its offer has been
accepted, and the assets have been exchanged.
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Figure 3. Load profile and Generation Profile in KWH per 15
minute interval. The horizontal axis shows time of day.
• depositEnergyAsset(assetID),
depositFinancial(amount): smart contract transactions called
by a prosumer, depositing energy and financial assets to the
prosumer’s account. The transaction specifies the assets, and
it must be cryptographically signed by the anonymous address
that owns them. Note that to protect privacy, the transaction
does not specify the prosumer, so the DSO has to keep track of
which prosumer has used which anonymous address.
• AssetDeposited(anonAddress, assetID),
FinancialDeposited(anonAddress, amount): event broad-
cast by the smart contract, notifying the DSO that assets have
been deposited from anonymous address, which triggers the
transfer of these assets to the prosumer’s account at the DSO.
4.3 Case Study
We use data collected by Siemens, from a microgrid in Germany,
to demonstrate a simulated transactive scenario. Figure 3 shows
the total energy produced in this system over the day, and the
total energy consumed. We use a T = 15 minute time interval for
bids and asks. We picked a 3.5 hour time interval (from 2:15pm to
5:45pm) and 2 producers and 7 consumers that overlapped with
the peak of production capacity (see Figure 3). We ran the network
across six virtual machines, each with 2 virtual CPUs, 4 GB RAM
and 40 GB hard-disk. The geth clients (one per actor) and miners
were equally distributed on this network. The actors (Prosumers
and DSO) were written in Python, and they communicated with
the geth clients using JSON-RPC API provided by Ethereum. The
actors communicated with each other using RIAPS and polled the
blockchain ledger for transactional updates using custom filters,
which are supported by the Ethereum API.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the time between when an
offer was made by a producer, and then the time when the offer was
accepted by a consumer and cleared. As shown by Figure 2, this
includes two transactions, postOffer and acceptOffer, which
have to be verified and recorded by the miners. To clear these two
transactions, at least two blocks need to be mined. The statistics
of the clearing-time distribution are as follows: average = 11.79
seconds, median = 11 seconds, variance = 46.74, maximum = 38
seconds, minimum = 0 seconds, and 90% of trades were cleared
within 23 seconds or less.
4.4 Requirements Analysis Discussion
We conclude this section with a brief discussion of how PETra
satisfies the requirements outlined in Section 2.
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Figure 4. Histogram of time it takes to clear the two transactions
related to post offer and accept offer. 90% of the trades were closed
within 23 seconds or less.
Communication Fabric: The key requirements for communi-
cation are reliability and security. In PETra, communication and
messaging services are built on (a) RIAPS between the DSO and
prosumers, and (b) blockchain transactions and events between the
smart contract and other components. The RIAPS communication
layer [15] presents a reliable messaging service, which is being
currently extended to provide message confidentiality, integrity,
and non-repudiation with the help of digital signatures. Since com-
munication between prosumers and the DSO (i.e. withdrawal) may
happen well in advance of actual trading, the DSO and the messag-
ing service do not have to be online continuously. Combined with
the features of RIAPS, this flexibility in uptime leads to a very high
level of reliability.
For messaging between the smart contract and other compo-
nents, the blockchain provides a secure and reliable communication
medium. The blockchain ledger is an immutable, complete, and fully
auditable record, which guarantees integrity and non-repudiation
for transactions and events. Note that—by design—the blockchain
does not provide confidentiality, since every transaction and event
is public; we will discuss privacy implications and requirements
in detail below. Finally, the blockchain provides a high level of
reliability since the ledger is maintained by multiple nodes, which
can reach consensus even in the presence of some misbehaving or
malicious nodes.
Operational Safety, Cyber-Physical Security, and Market
Safety: For safety and cyber-physical security, it is crucial to ensure
that trading activity cannot compromise the stability of the grid and
congestion constraints are respected. PETra achieves these goals
by enabling the DSO to tightly control the amount of energy that a
prosumer may (offer to) sell or buy. A prosumer’s energy trading
workflow (see Figure 2) always begins with a withdrawal from the
DSO. By limiting the amount assets that can be withdrawn, the
DSO limits the bids and asks that may be posted by a prosumer,
thereby enforcing safety requirements (e.g., preventing a prosumer
from offering to produce more power than her production capacity).
Fine-grained withdrawal rules based on time, power, etc, can be
used to prevent a wide range of negligent or malicious trading.
To protect the prosumers’ interests, we must enable them to
detect and prove if they are incorrectly billed or denied fair partic-
ipation in the market. PETra meets these goals due to the public,
fully auditable, and immutable nature of the blockchain ledger.
Privacy: Privacy requirements dictate that prosumers cannot
gain information regarding other prosumers’ consumption and
production—not even if they are trade partners. This requirement
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presents an interesting challenge since every transaction on the
blockchain ledger is public. PETra provides privacy through pseudony-
mous trading; instead of real identities, prosumers use randomly
chosen addresses for trading with each other. However, pseudony-
mous addresses could be de-anonymized either by (a) learning
which addresses belong to the same prosumer or (b) using the pro-
sumers’ communication addresses (e.g., IP addresses used to send
transactions). Firstly, by employing a large number of anonymous
addresses, a prosumer can effectively prevent de-anonymization
attacks that would link her addresses together.5 Secondly, by com-
bining our platform with a communication anonymity solution,
such as onion routing, we can prevent de-anonymization based on
communication addresses.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
A transaction management platform (TMP) is the key component
of a transactive energy system. The role of the TMP is to facili-
tate the deployment of applications that help maintain stability of
the microgrid, as well as implement efficient market mechanisms
and enable an open P2P energy trading market. In this paper we
proposed a blockchain-based TMP called PETra, which extends
existing works by (1) leveraging a decentralized computation fabric
provided by the smart homes in the microgrid, (2) addressing the
privacy threat posed by trading using a novel trading sequence
implementation, (3) showing how partial trades can be fulfilled,
and (4) using off-blockchain communication primitives provided
by the distributed application management platform RIAPS.
During the experiments, we made the following observations:
Blockchains are not enough by themselves to implement a full-
fledged TMP for transactive energy systems.We need off-blockchain
communication for (1) performance (transactions may be slow) (2)
reliability (transactions may be lost before they are permanently
recorded) (3) privacy (we can anonymize assets by mixing on the
blockchain, but doing it off-blockchain is much more efficient). Ad-
ditionally, existing smart contract languages (e.g., Solidity) have
some serious limitations (and peculiarities), which complicate the
implementation of some domain logic. For instance, at the time of
writing, Solidity did not provide floating-point data types.
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